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Perspectives on Group Representation
By DEBORAH L. RHODE*

As I reviewed the initial draft of these comments, I was reminded of a characterization of Warren Harding's public statements. His speeches reportedly left "the impression of an army of
pompous phrases moving over the landscape in search of an idea.
Sometimes these meandering words would actually capture a straggling thought and bear it triumphantly as a prisoner in their midst
until it died of servitude and overwork."'
The thought I hope to capture for brief service here, involves
how to link understandings about group identity with the realities
of legal practice. This is a task approached with some caution,
since building such connections is what we're always for in theory
but seldom actually manage to pull off in practice. Yet having
made that disclaimer, I still think the effort is worthwhile, for
there are two extremely rich literatures on group representation
that deserve to have more than passing acquaintance. The first
body of work focuses on essentialism and its critics. A promnnent
issue in much critical race and fenmst theory is how we can make
claims for, by, or about particular groups without a homogemzed
view of their members' essential experience. A second body of
work has to do with the practical dilemmas of representing such
groups in legal actions that have class-wide significance without
adequate mechanisms for class-wide accountability
What interests me about this topic is its connection not only
to crucial issues of contemporary legal theory, but also to questions
of professional responsibility. Group representation provides an
excellent vehicle for integrating legal ethics issues into mainstream
constitutional and jurisprudential analyses. As I have argued at
length elsewhere, such an integrative approach is essential to any
adequate development of professional responsibility in professional
education and professional practice. 2 Failure to address ethical
issues as they arise in substantive areas encourages practitioners to
*

Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. B.A. 1974, J.D. 1977, Yale Umversity.
Wimm G. McADoo, CRowDED YEARs 388-89 (1931).

2 See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method,
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do the same. It also sends a message that no ceremonial platitudes
or single law school course can counteract. Thinking critically
about issues such as group representation should be a pervasive
part of efforts to develop good law and good lawyering.
Let me begin by trying to situate the debate about essentialism
in its broader theoretical context. To make a long story extremely
short, contemporary feminist and critical race theorists have, in
parallel ways, long differed over difference. These two partially
overlapping bodies of thought include a wide range of perspectives
that don't easily coexist under a single label. But for purposes of
these comments, it is possible to trace a few major themes.
Much of the effort over the last quarter century in feminist
legal scholarship has centered on either challenging or reclaiming
gender difference. One strategy has been to contest the way law
reflects and reinforces gender stereotypes underpinning gender subordination. A second line of work has demanded that law do more
to reflect and reinforce concerns traditionally associated with
women.
So, for example, in contexts involving groups, feminists have
demanded not only that women be admitted on the same terms as
men, but also that group structures change to accommodate women's interests. 3 Yet how those interests should be defined points up
a longstanding tension in feminist theory. By definition, what gives
feminism its distinct status is its claim to speak for women from
women's experience. Yet that experience also counsels sensitivity
to the variation in women's backgrounds, perspectives, and priorities.
Building on other currents in post-modem theory, recent work
in feminist jurisprudence challenges many of its own as well as the
dominant culture's assumptions about women's essential identity.
These anti-essentialist critiques have called into question certain
common generalizations about gender, such as the notion that
women are particularly likely to value connection to others in
relationships and that women as a group share a common experience of subordination. Much of this work, which is either part of,
or informed by, critical race theory, underscores the multiple and
See generally MARTHA MIwow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLU(1990); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER (1989); Deborah
L. Rhode, Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Differences, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTnVEs
ON SEXUAL. DIFFERENCES (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstruct3
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ing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1987).
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shifting dimensions of female identity. 4 From this perspective, there

is no "generic woman." 5 Rather, women's experience, and consciousness of experience, grows out of the intersection of gender

and other attributes, such as race, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and so forth. At this point, the merits of this position have

become so obvious to so many feminists that they can joke about
nightmares in which their daughters grow up to be not cheerleaders
6
but essentialists.
Yet this recognition carries a cost. Once we acknowledge the
particularity and partiality of women's views, how do we make
claims to speak for a collectivity? How do we prevent diffusion
and dilution of women's energies? Once we deconstruct the concept
of women, who will be around to organize the marches?
This same "we the people" dilemma also confronts critical race
theorists. If race, like gender, is not fixed or immutable, but
historically and socially constituted, particular groups can claim no

authoritative core of common identity. And if the racial or ethnic
experience of subordination differs materially across gender, age,
class, and sexual orientation, what does it mean to speak in the
7
voice of color?

These issues have considerable practical as well as theoretical
significance. Litigation by and for a group often presents difficulties in defining the group's identity and interests. Members may

4 See, e.g., PATRICIA WnLIAMs, Tnn ALCm-MY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1990); Kimberle
Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL
F. 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 217 (1990); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism and FeministLegal Theory, 12 HARv. WoMN'S
L.J. 115 (1989); see also Christine A. Littleton, Does it Still Make Sense to Talk About
Women, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 30-37 (1991); infra note 7.
1 See EuzABmTn SPELMAN, THm INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEnnsT THOUGHT 167 (1988); see also DIANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FMIqM,
NATURE AND DIFFERENCE (1989); Deborah L. Rhode, The No-Problem Problem: Feminist
Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731 (1991).
6 See Frances Olsen, Address to Conference on Frontiers of Legal Thought, Duke
Law School (Jan. 26, 1990) quoted in Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist
Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1, 7 n.15
(1990).
( See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991);
Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations,22 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 322 (1987); Deborah W. Post, Reflections on Identity, Diversity, and
Morality, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 136, 146-64 (1991); sources cited supra note 4; see
also Responses to Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 HARv. L.
REv. 1844 (1990) (debating Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102
HARv. L. REv. 1745 (1989)).
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differ on legal strategies, remedial objectives, and willingness to
compromise. Trade-offs may be necessary between current and
future class members and between prospective or compensatory
relief.8 As is obvious from litigation like the Boston school desegregation case described in Derrick Bell's classic article, 9 such conflicts are not adequately addressed by vague procedural mandates
about adequate representation of class interests. And for equally
obvious reasons, the problems are even more pronounced in settings where group concerns are implicated but not formally represented.
Although that last point seems too self-evident to belabor, it
often goes unacknowledged in standard treatments of social reform
legislation and litigation. For example, in conventional treatments
of pornography, the relatively few cases, casebooks, and commissions that consider feminist challenges rarely explore the diversity
of perspectives among women. 10 So too, proponents of antipornography ordinances tend to speak from the "women's point of
view"" without noting the risks many women express about inviting more state repression- "more sexual shame, guilt and hypoc12
risy, this time served up as feminism.'
All of this raises the question: if essentialist concepts of groups
are what we're against, what exactly are we for? This is hardly an
uncomplicated issue and fortunately I am almost out of time. But
in broad outline, what we need are alliances based both on the
particularity of individual experience and a recognition of common
patterns. At the theoretical level, we need a fuller acknowledgement
of the multiple sources of identity and the intersecting patterns of

9See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183,
1187-91 (1982) (citing cases).
9 Derrick Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration, Ideals, and Client Interests in
School Desegregationand Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).

1' Of its two thousand pages of reported testimony, the Attorney General Commission's on Pornography heard from 30 women reporting injuries from pornography but none
that enjoyed it or used it therapeutically. See Robin West, The Feminist-ConservativeAntiPornography Alliance, and the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography

Report, 1987 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 681. Of the major constitutional law casebooks
published by Foundation, Little Brown, and West, only three have any sustained discussion
of feminist challenges.

u See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not A Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y R

. 321,

325 (1984) ("If I ask, from the point of view of women's experience, does [the male judge

or legislator] know what I know when I see [obscenity] ...

I doubt it, given what's on the

newsstands.").
'2

Ellen Willis, Feminism, Moralism, and Pornography,in PoWMs oF DasMnE: THE

Poimcs oF SEXUALITY 467 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983).

1991-92]

TBE RiGHTS oF GRouPs

inequality. At the practical level, we also need more procedural
tools that force group representatives to take account of group
diversity.
For example, courts and counsel in class actions should have
to make a record concerning any conflict of interest and the
adequacy of measures taken to address it. Such measures should
more often include intelligible forms of notice, solicitation of preferences, and subsidized intervention for unrepresented interests.
Under current procedures, opportunities for participation typically
occur too early, too late, or not at all. Potential participants may
not have notice except at the class certification stage, before they
realize the implications of judicial relief, or at the conclusion of a
lawsuit, when the shape of remedial intervention has already been
worked out and objections are least likely to have impact. 3 A more
adequate conception of group identity would require that affected
parties have earlier opportunities to address their differences and
to forge their own accommodations. That is particularly necessary
in contexts involving structural changes, where long run effectiveness will depend on group members' own skills at building coalitions.
From that perspective, legal action can serve as a means to
broader ends of group empowerment. For example, in a recent
case challenging racial and sexual discrimination by the San Francisco fire department, various subgroups with competing economic
interests played a direct role in shaping litigation strategies. 14 For
lawyers, the process was complicated, confrontational, and risky,
since the defendants attempted to exploit schisms within the class.
But the end result was a united front-a refusal to accept any
settlement that would fall to address all of the intersecting patterns
of inequality. And perhaps even more important, the process itself
for alliances between various women's
strengthened the capacity
15
and civil rights groups.
A similar process needs to occur in many cases that do not
formally proceed as class actions. Feminists that sought better
antipornography strategies might have had greater success by forg-

13 See

generally Rhode, supra note 8.
1, See Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 248 (1990).
,5 See Shauna Marshall, United We Stand: A Look at the Class Desegregation Suit
Against the San FranciscoFire Department (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Kentucky Law Journal).
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ing coalitions with other feminists groups, rather than with rightwing organizations that supported traditional gender roles. 16 Activists like Catharine MacKinnon are clearly right in questioning
whether male decision makers, who claim to "know pornography
when [they] see it," see the same things as women. But those
activists also need to acknowledge that not every woman sees only
what they see.
What we need, in short, is more attention to the problematic
nature of group identity and the process by which it is constituted,
challenged, and claimed. Clearly, that focus comes at a cost: it
means giving up some of our pretensions and aspirations to unity.
But the result is likely to be a richer sense of commonality than
one that suppresses differences. As is often said about Wagner's
music, it may be better than it sounds.

16 For discussion of the conflict among feminists see Paul Brest & Amy Vandenberg,
Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-PornographyMovement in Minneapolis,
39 STAN. L. REv. 607 (1987); Mary Jo Frug, Commentary, A Post Modern Feminist Legal
Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARvARD L. REv. 1045, 1073 (1992); Lisa Duggan,
Censorship in the Name of Feminism, TE VIILAGE VOICE, Oct. 16, 1984, at 11.

